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Chapter 7
Organized Mobility and Relational Turnover 
as Context for Social Mechanisms: A Dynamic 
Invariant at the Heart of Stability 
from Movement
Emmanuel Lazega
Movements following paths that Harrison White (1970) calls “vacancy chains” 
(p. 17) can be seen as forms of rotation across systems of places that are often 
socially organized circuits.1 White calls such movements “mobility in loops” 
(p. 380). From his structural perspective, not all loops or systems of places are nec-
essarily visible to the actors involved, or even to managers of organizations who 
track, measure, and sometimes steer other people’s careers. Internal or external 
labor markets were the first contexts White (1970) identified for such circuits. These 
loops are also the daily focus of attention of lay citizens and professional observers 
alike, representing revolving doors for a wide range of actors. That group includes 
high-status people between the business world and government—from investment 
banks to the Treasury, for example. It is composed partly of workers subjected to 
employment “flexibility” and struggling step by step to make the necessary moves 
a reality while keeping limbos between jobs as short as possible. It also encom-
passes managers rotating their employees and themselves from one service to the 
other in the company, as with associates assigned to different partners and clients of 
the firm in successive and heterogeneous task forces. It consists, too, of directors 
moving from one corporate board to the other in a closed chain, and of sales repre-
sentatives participating each year in dozens of recurrent and similar trade fairs of 
their industry (Brailly, Favre, Chatellet, & Lazega, 2015). Many analogous circuits 
1 The term place is used here in a general sense to refer to a location that can be occupied by an 
individual in any formally organized circuit, which can be geographical, organizational, or both. It 
is to be distinguished from the term position (White, Boorman, & Breiger, 1976)—a set of struc-
turally equivalent actors called a “social niche” (Lazega, 2001, p. 25) when the ties between actors 
in the position are dense. A position makes sense in a system of positions (or niches) that differs 
from, though always combined and coevolving with, the system of places (Lazega, 2013). Space 
(contiguity) and network (connectivity), for example, are both different and related.
E. Lazega (*) 
Department of Sociology at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris,  
Centre for the Sociology of Organizations, 19 rue Amélie, 75007 Paris, France
e-mail: emmanuel.lazega@sciencespo.fr
120
exist around and beyond labor markets as well. Migrants in comparatively wealthy 
countries attract people from the same place of origin and sometimes return there 
after having been overused to sweep floors and dig holes. Students can spend semes-
ters pursuing their curriculum in universities of different countries before returning 
to their alma mater. Geographers and sociologists can ultimately examine broad 
residential forms of mobility of individuals and entire communities. By doing so, 
they see, for example, mobility in loops of neighborhoods or as life-cycle-related 
mobility of young adults moving together into new places, then to bigger places 
when they have children, then to smaller ones when the children leave home.
Sociologists have also looked independently at turnover in networks of personal 
relations. In an increasingly rich body of literature, they have described and mod-
eled relational turnover, using statistical tools designed to deepen the understanding 
of network dynamics (Snijders, 1996; 2005). Relational turnover is defined in this 
chapter as the set of changes observed in an actor’s relationships between two 
moments in time (e.g., the creation or addition of new relationships, the destruction 
or disappearance of previous relationships, and the maintenance of relationships). 
Dynamic models of coevolution of behavior and networks are based on analyses of 
this relational turnover in members’ profiles and in the composition and structure of 
the collective. When people close their eyes and ignore a situation marked by con-
flicts of interest, is it because they have become friends with someone who tends to 
do the same thing and influences them in that direction? Or is it because from the 
outset they chose friends from among people who, like themselves, close their eyes 
when confronted by situations of this kind? Often, both answers are true, but each 
effect has a relative weight that can be measured only by observing and analyzing 
behavioral changes and relational turnover over time. Without such analyses of 
coevolution of behavior and relational turnover, intuitions about concerted igno-
rance as a complex phenomenon, i.e. difficult to observe, remain poor and explana-
tions of this phenomenon as a social process remain untested.2 The act of changing 
structural forms and relational infrastructures triggers changes in social processes 
downstream. All the main social phenomena, such as solidarity, exclusion and dis-
crimination, social control, conflict resolution, learning, socialization, regulation, 
and institutionalization, have a relational dimension, are a function of relational 
infrastructures, and reshape structure, at least opportunity structures.3
2 In many ways work by Snijders (1996, 2005) strongly reflects the best social science epistemo-
logical practice in which researchers measure, formalize, and model the coevolution of behaviour 
and interdependencies, of interdependencies and conflicts between actors, both individual and 
collective. This approach compares models against reality and measurements of reality, but also 
inspires new intuitions about realities too complex and difficult to observe directly. In short, mod-
els, measurements, theories, and the object of analysis coevolve.
3 The list of social processes that facilitate collective action between status competitors and that can 
be modeled by network analysis is indefinite (i.e., there is no finite list of these processes) because 
no social processes exist without a relational dimension. Relational processes that characterize 
collective action undertaken by interdependent entrepreneurs have been the object of neostructural 
formalizations: integration, assimilation, cooptation, balance of power, evaluation of product qual-
ity, exploitation, extraction of economic performance, discrimination, and desolidarization. These 
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Often overlooked in the literature, however, is the systematic, recursive, and 
transformative link between the two realities—mobility (rotation) across systems of 
places and relational turnover—and that link’s implications for social life. There is 
a connection between movement and human relationships, for actors switch places 
in these circuits and change occurs as a consequence, at least in part, in their respec-
tive sets of relationships—and, by extension, in their relational capital. In addition, 
the latter change affects the evolution of the system of places itself, an evolution that 
is apparent only if places are regarded not as purely contextual and exogenous but 
rather as endogenized by members themselves and thus as endogenous to the mech-
anisms under study. The connection between movement and relational capital is 
often explored in detail in specific areas of social life. Migration networks, for 
example, are prototypical. When members of a family migrate across continents, 
separations between them and the family remaining in the country of origin are 
often devastating for individuals and social communities. The focus in studies on 
their situation is therefore justifiably on coping with the costs of leaving families 
behind, on marginality, loneliness, and the creation and management of new rela-
tionships by agents striving for their own or their children’s social mobility and 
assimilation. But the mechanics and social costs of this link also deserve explora-
tion, as do the effects that such movements have on the structure and governance of 
the system of places. It is about the stability and change of the system and the 
opportunity structure that it represents for its members.
The structuration, or transformation, of organized mobility and relational turn-
over (OMRT) may be called the complex dynamics that lead individuals and orga-
nizations to change part of their relational and social capital as they switch places in 
relatively closed, partly overlapping loops, whether formally institutionalized or 
emergent. These dynamics trigger social processes that may, under specific circum-
stances, reshape the initial opportunity structure of some members of the setting but 
not that of others. Each domain of social and economic life and every field of atten-
dant research in the social sciences has its OMRT structuration processes. I define 
OMRT structuration as the dynamic link—as mediated by “dynamic invariants”—
between places and positions. I use the label organized to qualify mobility, for both 
social actors and the social system create paths and rules for movements that are not 
allowed to be random. Whether physical or social or both, these linked, articulated 
movements and changes are fundamental to social structure and social order in the 
processes, which together contribute, for example, to cooperation between competitors, remain 
separate only for analytical purposes. They are dynamically linked, as by retroactive effects. The 
redefinition of rules can engender new solidarities. Normative beliefs produced by the regulatory 
process influence choices of advisors and, hence, learning, among other processes. Controversies 
in part energize the evolution of structures that facilitate collective learning. They contribute to the 
endogenous formation of the constraints that actors can then consider legitimate or not legitimate 
and that they submit to more or less voluntarily. Research is only just beginning on the manner of 
connection (articulation) between these processes and the forms of social discipline that they cre-
ate (see Lazega, 2009; 2012).
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organizational society (Perrow, 1991).4 They are created by the social organization 
of these milieus and end up, under conditions that remain to be spelled out, restruc-
turing these milieus, taking some members somewhere and others nowhere. 
Dynamics of OMRT are not simply a recursive and alternating movement between 
two separate poles influencing each other while competing in doing the same thing. 
OMRT dynamics involve more complex evolution because they have an impact on 
fundamental social processes. These processes all have a relational dimension, and 
all depend on relational infrastructure that facilitates their deployment (Lazega, 
2001, 2003, 2012).
A neostructural approach to the relationship between behavior and position in 
the social structure takes these dynamics into account and provides this endogenous 
understanding of social change and system stability.5 From this perspective, posi-
tion in the structure is not a static place in a static order. It results from specific 
social dynamics. These dynamics can be approached through the notion and mea-
surements of relational infrastructures, i.e.social forms in the sense meant by 
Simmel (1908/2009). At least two such forms are needed to position actors in the 
structure, describe their attempts to modify their opportunity structure, and explain 
the deployment of generic social processes that help them, as members of a collec-
tive, deal with the pitfalls of collective action (e.g., freeloading and crowding in the 
production and consumption of collective goods). The two social forms are niches 
and status, which represent underlying social differentiations, horizontal and verti-
cal, in the social space. It is not surprising that status as a social form is key to the 
deployment of social processes. In general, sociological theory, status refers to a 
member’s relative position in the formal hierarchy of the group, as well as in its 
internal networks of exchanges (Blau, 1964; Hughes, 1945; Lenski, 1954; Merton, 
1957). Members’ status can be understood as a translation of their present and past 
contributions to the group’s cooperative system into a right to participate actively, 
and sometimes to lead. Sociological classics have long stressed the salience of many 
dimensions of social status and social approval. Weber (1924), for example, distin-
guished between three—economic (based on the control of production apparatus), 
social (based on honor and prestige derived from birth and from human capital, or 
education), and political (based on control of the state apparatus)—which can over-
lap in stable economic conditions.
4 The term organizational society has several dimensions. According to Perrow (1991), it means 
that large-scale public or private organizations “absorb” (p. 726) societal functions that can be 
performed by communities. It also means that a system of interdependent organizations interlinked 
at the mesolevel in a multilevel network shapes the opportunity and constraint structure of citizens 
by coordinating, for example, various forms of opportunity-hoarding (Tilly, 1998). Lastly, the term 
organizational society is a metaphor for the tendency of individuals to act at the individual and 
organizational levels simultaneously and for the observation that domination (in the sense meant 
by Weber, 1924) is linked to the control of organizations as “tools with a life of their own” 
(Selznick, 1949, p. 24).
5 Contemporary neostructuralism is different from the structuralism of the 1960s in that the former 
draws on a theory of individual and collective action to articulate structure, culture, and agency 
(Archer, 1988; Lazega & Favereau, 2002).
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This chapter focuses on status to theorize the relationship between OMRT 
dynamics and social processes, in particular collective learning. In neostructural 
vocabulary social processes differ from OMRT dynamics. In a collective of interde-
pendent members, social processes are combined and iterated actions and interac-
tions that help these members manage the dilemmas of collective action by 
constituting a form of social discipline that the same members consider to be legiti-
mate, at least temporarily. OMRT dynamics are the micro- and macrophenomena 
that shape and reshape these social processes and can be considered as being among 
the determinants thereof. The process taken as an example in this chapter is collec-
tive learning. In this process status is a central relational infrastructure (Blau, 1964; 
Krackhardt, 1990; Lazega, 1992). Indeed, the quest for status (an individual’s 
importance) in the collective, which presupposes participation in status competi-
tion, is another way of seeking to modify one’s opportunity structure to one’s advan-
tage. Social status is an inevitable basis for strategies intended to modify opportunity 
structures. In effect, the multiple dimensions of social status can be measured as 
concentrations of different kinds of resources. Network analysis offers measures 
(essentially, centrality and prominence), that identify heterogeneous and endoge-
nous forms of status (and not simply exogenous forms as in Weber). From a more 
endogenous perspective, a person can achieve status in many local ways, such as by 
demonstrating great competence, assuming administrative responsibilities, gaining 
popularity, concentrating various sorts of specific assets, or even receiving the 
endorsement of members with status. Status competition paves the way to a man-
date to represent the collective, control resources, gain authority, and define the 
terms of social exchanges, but also to protect one’s regulatory interests and partially 
resist being thrust from “above” into overt competition.
Status will thus help construe and measure these dynamics for an indispensable 
process of collective action and social life in communities in which it is a nota-
ble relational infrastructure: collective learning. This example will illustrate 
that such infrastructures have a salient role in linking OMRT and social processes. 
Theorizing these dynamics shows that geographers, historians, and sociologists 
have a strong interest in collaborating in research on OMRT structuration and on the 
social costs it entails.
 Illustration: A Spinning-Top Model of Collective Learning
It may be useful to start this exploration with an empirical case study that illustrates 
some of the complexities of OMRT dynamics. The research was used to explore the 
OMRT model and permits a look at intraorganizational learning networks at the 
intersection of the sociology of organizations, economic sociology, and the sociol-
ogy of law. Intraorganizational learning has been considered a significant process in 
organizations ever since the publication of March and Simon’s (1958) perspective. 
The relevance of studying this process has grown with the number of knowledge- 
intensive organizations, which thrive on innovation, and with the concomitant 
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search for new competitive advantages. Learning as a relational and interactive pro-
cess can be captured through the study of advice networks. In organized contexts it 
is usually possible to consult with someone through social exchange in which mem-
bers obtain advice in exchange for recognition of the advisor’s status and authority 
(Blau, 1955), which can be called epistemic status. Members with epistemic status 
usually have hierarchical authority, professional authority, or expert authority, if not 
two or even all three of these forms of authority combined (Lazega, 1992).6
The case is based on an organizational and longitudinal network study of advice- 
seeking among judges at the Commercial Court of Paris. The French Commercial 
Court is a judicial, local, first-level consular jurisdiction dealing with commercial 
litigation and bankruptcies in the French economy.7 Its judges are unpaid lay volun-
teers from the local business community, and they are expected to pool their experi-
ence and knowledge of business practices and customs in order to find solutions to 
conflicts therein. They are elected or coopted for 2- or 4-year terms (but no more than 
14 years) by an electoral body composed of other judges already sitting at the same 
court and by representatives of the trade associations of the Chamber of Commerce 
of their local jurisdiction. Most consular judges remain for the whole 14-year tenure, 
allowing social groups to form and be sustained within the organization. Of the 156 
consular judges at the Commercial Court of Paris in 2005, 38 % were bankers and 
insurers, for the financial industry is currently the only one that can afford to send 
large numbers of senior managers to perform as judges in such an institution (see 
Lazega, Lemercier, & Mounier, 2006; Lazega & Mounier, 2009, 2012; Lazega, 
Mounier, Snijders, & Tubaro, 2012; Lazega, Sapulete, & Mounier, 2011).
The court is composed of 20 specialized and general chambers dealing with 
bankruptcies and widely diverse forms of commercial litigation (such as corporate 
law, European Union law, international law, unfair competition, multimedia, and 
new technologies). It handles around 12 % of all the commercial litigation in France, 
including large and complex cases for which companies decide not to go to arbitra-
tion courts. The consular judges rotate annually from one chamber to another. The 
policy of rotating judges across the chambers is intended to prevent corruption and 
6 Expert authority can be defined as professional authority exercised among nonprofessionals, i.e. 
by sharing minimal knowledge for action with the latter across the professional/lay boundary.
7 An explanation of the term consular is in order. The consulat was a mode of urban government 
practiced in the Middle Ages in the southern part of the Kingdom of France by cities with a right 
to self-administration and self-defense. Consulatus is a noun formed from consul, meaning “coun-
cil.” The word referred to a community’s ability to deliberate in an assembly (likewise called the 
consulat.). Urban communities governed by a consulat could call themselves cities. All had mar-
kets, and many had fairs. In a régime consulaire the community governed itself through consuls, 
who varied in number and qualification. Merchants organized as socially distinct guilds occupied 
a pivotal place in the régime consulaire. Drawing on the lex mercatoria (commercial law), they 
managed to negotiate, with the emerging French state, something akin to joint regulation of their 
business activities within the consulat framework: Their local self-regulation was to be founded on 
the state’s sanctioning power. The state, whose own administration was still embryonic, may para-
doxically have seen this cooptation by local merchants as a means of further extending its central 
control over the country. A major component of the consular regime is the tribunal de commerce, 
or commercial court, whose purview evolved over time.
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conflicts of interests (as could occur if judges were to come from the banking industry 
and concentrate in bankruptcy chambers).
Tasks are complex, and judges have discretion in many areas of business law. 
Disagreements over solutions to many legal problems abound. Commercial litiga-
tion varies, with conflict resolution often depending on knowledge of the specific 
business and industry in which the conflict has arisen. To manage these uncertain-
ties intraorganizationally, the judges are keen on seeking each other’s advice, draw-
ing on their professionally heterogeneous set of colleagues. When a judge coming 
from the hotel industry must decide in a case brought by two opposing banks, for 
example, she has many banking-sector colleagues with whom she can consult about 
customs and current issues in the financial industry or about banking law.
Data for this chapter was gathered at three points in time (fall 2000, fall 2002, 
and fall 2005). All the judges were interviewed face to face about their advice- 
seeking among each other. The following name generator was used:
Here is the list of all your colleagues at this Tribunal, including the President and Vice- 
Presidents of the Tribunal, the Presidents of the Chambers, the judges, and “wise men.” 
Using this list, please check the names of colleagues from whom you have asked advice 
about a complex case in the previous two years or with whom you have had basic discus-
sions outside formal deliberations in order to elicit a different point of view on it.
A high average response rate (87.1 %) over the three stated periods made it possible 
to reconstitute the entire advice network (outside formal deliberations) among 
judges at this courthouse at each point in time. The number of judges at the court 
from 2000 to 2005 varied from 151 to 156.
Longitudinal analyses of the advice network among these lay judges have facili-
tated a close look at the structural factors that explain relational turnover in the 
network—that is, the creation of new ties and the discontinuation of previous ones. 
This work was based on Snijders’s (1996, 2005) Siena models of dynamic analysis 
of the evolution of this network (see Lazega et al., 2006; Lazega et al., 2012). They 
tease out a cyclical process of centralization and decentralization in the network 
over time. Movement in this organizational system of places, change in the system 
of places, and the attendant emergence of status are all visible in this cycle of cen-
tralization–decentralization. Through these cyclical dynamics individuals eventu-
ally attain epistemic status and displace incumbent status-holders at the top of the 
hierarchy. Such evolution helps reproduce the persistent organizational structure 
and characterizes the continuous collective learning process in the organization.
 OMRT Transformations as Determinants of Collective 
Learning: Cyclical Dynamics of Advice Networks
An advice network represents a set of paths through which appropriate information 
circulates among members of an organized setting. The allocation of this resource 
through informal ties and interactions reduces the costs of its acquisition during the 
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process of making decisions to solve problems. Members of organizations see 
expertise and experience as accumulated by the organization, and they rely con-
stantly on advice from others. However, intraorganizational learning through 
advice-seeking does not simply result from the accumulation of individually and 
informally acquired information. The process is socially organized in a sophisti-
cated way.
In organizations examined by researchers, advice-seeking converges toward 
senior and recognized members and reflects a process of epistemic alignment with 
(or orientation to) members who have gained epistemic status and the “authority to 
know,” who give social approval for specific decisions, and who contribute to inte-
grating the organization by linking the individual, group, and organizational levels. 
This alignment may be thought of as a key ingredient of intraorganizational learn-
ing. Providing a social incentive for actors to share their knowledge and experience 
with others, a status hierarchy helps explain the social organization of the learning 
process. For example, social exchange and status help solve a learning dilemma in 
which it is rational for individuals to pursue the maximum organizational share of 
joint learning by taking more knowledge than they give. At the same time, the rela-
tive withholding of knowledge reduces the total amount of joint learning from 
which persons attempt to appropriate their individual share (Larsson, Bengtsson, 
Henriksson, & Sparks, 1998).
Because advice networks are usually shaped by such status ‘games’, they are 
usually highly centralized. They exhibit a pecking order that often closely follows 
the hierarchical structure of the organization (Lazega, 2014). Members of formal 
organizations rarely declare that they seek advice from “people below” in this peck-
ing order. In addition to a core set of central advisors, the periphery of the network 
can be complex and characterized by homophilous (Lazega & van Duijn, 1997) 
horizontal ties (i.e., ties among peers). Members use such ties to mitigate the nega-
tive effects that this strict rule can have on intraorganizational action and learning 
(e.g., unwillingness to show that one does not know the answer to a question). 
Advice networks thus tend to be both hierarchical and cohesive (at least within sub-
sets of peers), with the hierarchical dimension usually being stronger than the cohe-
sive one. In some firms advice ties are crucial in facilitating the flows of other kinds 
of resources in coworkers’ and friendship ties (Lazega & Pattison, 1999).
A “spinning-top model” accounts for the dynamics of advice networks in orga-
nizations by furnishing a main metaphor for research on the relationship between 
formal organization and intraorganizational process. It shows that intraorganiza-
tional collective learning depends on the organization’s capacity to generate an elite 
group of authoritative advisors with epistemic status that remains stable. By con-
trast, advice ties among other organizational members undergo rapid turnover (due, 
say, to rotation policy, career movement, or the need for new knowledge that old 
advisors cannot offer; Ortega, 2001; Kane, Argote, & Levine, 2005). More gener-
ally, the spinning- top model illustrates a new approach to the relationship between 
formal organization and informal social behavior and processes.
As a model for a dynamic process, the spinning-top heuristic brings together at 
least three components: a rotating body, a rotation axis, and a fragile equilibrium 
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that depends partly on characteristics of the first two components. I define these 
terms metaphorically and loosely. The rotating body represents the learning organi-
zation—the population of judges who switch places once a year in a circular system 
of places, as with a carrousel or “mobility in loops” (White, 1970, p. 380). The rota-
tion axis represents a pecking order: a vertical differentiation between the judges 
and the emergent hierarchy of members with epistemic status. This axis can be 
pictured as the spinning top’s shaft, which supplies the angular momentum that 
keeps the spinning top erect. It allows learning to take place in a system that remains 
stable thanks to its movement. The fragile equilibrium created by the rotation move-
ment represents the structural condition for learning collectively in the organization 
and depends on the stability of the rotation axis and the shape of the organization. 
Time is taken into account through rotation and speed. These members have the 
authority to know in the organization. Formal structure is summarized in rotation 
rules across intraorganizational boundaries and in status differences. Infrastructural 
stability, that is necessary for collective learning and social processes in gen-
eral, comes from movement.
The endogenous evolution of advice networks is characterized by three interre-
lated moments. First, the centrality of members with high epistemic status varies 
over time. It initially tends to be reinforced. Pivotal members become ever more 
central in a Matthew effect (Merton, 1968): The more they attract advice-seekers, 
the more their reputation grows and, in turn, the more they are sought out. Among 
other members, there spreads the impression that turning to such a source for advice 
is safe and legitimating for their own knowledge claims, and that making this choice 
signals a rise in relative status. Concentration of epistemic authority thereby intensi-
fies with the centralization of advice networks as learning comes to depend on a 
dwindling number of sources of authoritative knowledge.
Second, in real-life organizations this centralization creates an overload for 
members with high epistemic status. These members tend to manage this overload 
by sharing some of their epistemic status, redirecting advice-seekers to other sources 
through recommendations. When advice from the handful of the supercentral advi-
sors becomes inaccessible, irrelevant, inaccurate, untimely, or rare, members turn to 
these other advisers, creating new epistemic stars. Sharing epistemic status (a form 
of delegation) enlarges the number of advisers and lessens the centralization of 
the network.
Third, the expansion in the number of central members with high epistemic sta-
tus in the organization creates a problem of epistemic conflicts, consensus, and 
coordination among epistemic authorities. If it is easy to co-orientate with them, 
equilibrium is established. If not, conflicts between epistemic authorities trigger 
recentralization. When collective action eventually becomes endangered by an 
excessive number of epistemic leaders, some of them withdraw or retire, and others 
are disqualified in one way or another. As their numbers decrease, it becomes easier 
at the top to recreate consensus around a common definition of the situation, to give 
coherent social benchmarks for homogeneous judgments of appropriateness 
(Lazega, 1992).
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These dynamics of centralization and decentralization in advice networks may 
not be purely endogenous. In other words, it might not be that overload due to 
 centralization leads the supercentral advisors to redirect advice-seekers to surrogates 
and thereby create new epistemic stars. The pattern of advice relations can be influ-
enced by the content of the advice sought, and external events may make one poten-
tial advisor a better source of advice than another. Nonetheless, the existence of this 
endogenous dimension of the process provides at least one mechanism that explains 
how particular supercentral elites are able to stabilize their position and surf at the 
top of the structure thanks to strong competition for epistemic authority and status.
This picture is heuristic for several reasons. First, it suggests that time is impor-
tant in allowing organizations to select members who possess epistemic status. The 
epistemic status of a person appreciates with his or her reputation for expertise, with 
the capacity to provide quality control without raising excessive controversy or con-
flict over the definition of the situation, and with the trained capacity to speak legiti-
mately on behalf of the collective. Acquiring this status takes effort and time. The 
authority to know stems from prolonged individual and collective investment that 
can be ruined if members with epistemic status leave or behave too opportunisti-
cally. The equilibrium achieved by the spinning top thus suggests that members 
with status and epistemic authority in the organization have a strong incentive to 
keep both over time, even at extra expense, to avoid losing advantages that come 
with their relative standing (see Frank, 1985).
Second, this heuristic suggests that the equilibrium achieved by the spinning top 
is fragile. It is not only the centrality but also the number of members with high 
epistemic status that varies over time. There are several conceivable reasons for this 
number’s fluctuation. One is that members tend to choose advisors whom they per-
ceive to be the most popular (i.e., already chosen by a large number of colleagues). 
Because such widely sought-out members within the organization are perceived to 
be safe and legitimate choices as advisors, their reputation grows. Given the mic-
ropolitical perspective that all people seek status and that they believe they will 
improve theirs, access to advisors higher up the ladder becomes in itself a sign of 
relative status. The implication is that a member highly sought out in time t1 will be 
even more intensely sought out in time t2.
Another reason for the rise and fall in the number of members with high epis-
temic status is that the first period in this process demands too much of the small 
circle of highly central advisors. Because these individuals often manage the over-
load by delegating, by referring the advice-seeker to other advisors, the number of 
new central advisors inflates to the point that the stability of the pecking order is 
jeopardized. Even without such delegation, however, the equilibrium remains frag-
ile, and for the same reasons. These elites must thus work together to avoid destruc-
tive status competition between them and avert infighting over the definition of the 
situation. In turn, this strategy either triggers formal attempts at coordination among 
the elites or reduces the number of central advisors through retirement or 
delegitimation.
The existence of this oscillation in the centralization of the advice network was 
detected through dynamic analyses of the network’s evolution (see Table 7.1). This 
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approach entailed a close look at the structural factors that explain the network’s 
relational turnover, that is, the creation of new ties that are added to or supplant 
hitherto existing ones.
This heuristic spinning-top model helps illustrate an OMRT context for pro-
cesses such as intraorganizational learning. The dynamics of the advice network 
examined in this commercial court can indeed be represented intuitively as a spin-
ning top. They are driven by the rotation rule in the formal structure of organization. 
Because judges seek advice first within their own Chamber, and because they 
change Chamber every year, the relational turnover in this network is high. Each 
year, each judge leaves behind several advisors and creates new advice ties within 
his or her new Chamber. This turnover, however, is compensated for by the creation 
of a set of advisors with epistemic status to whom judges turn for advice thanks to 
the Chamber in which they work. The centrality scores of members with epistemic 
status rise, then tend to decline over time, showing that the stabilization of this elite 
set of judges adds to the complexity of the dynamics of advice networks. Those 
dynamics come to include formally induced homophily, relational turnover, emer-
gence of status as an endogenous effect reinforcing exogenously defined status, 
centralization of the advice network, and strategies of stabilization of this elite 
under capacity constraints. It is likely that empirical observation will find a perpet-
ual cyclical pattern of centralization and decentralization in the advice network and 
that relative structural stability is achieved in part through OMRT.
These detailed analyses show that most judges achieve centrality over time, some 
of them to the point of losing part of it and their corresponding status in the cyclical 
dynamics precisely because they succeeded at sharing their status by delegating a 
degree of their advisory function to other colleagues (Lazega et al., 2011). Lack of 
space in this volume precludes detailed treatment of the substantive reasons for 
these dynamics of the advice networks in this specific context. The complex story 
behind this process of collective learning is a matter of alignment with the supercen-
tral judges who maintain themselves by trying to exercise epistemic control and 
balance excessive requests for advice (when too few colleagues occupy the top of 
Table 7.1 Collective learning as a cyclical process: increase, then decrease, of centralization in an 
advice network over time
Independent variables
Parameters for period 1a  
(Wave 1–Wave 2)
Parameters for period 2b  
(Wave 2–Wave 3)
Rate parameter 22.25 (2.03) 30.58 (3.14)
Density −1.74 (0.09) −2.23 (0.18)
Reciprocity 0.95 (0.16) 0.71 (0.13)
Transitivity 0.50 (0.04) 0.19 (0.01)
Popularity of alter 3.34 (0.40) 3.84 (0.25)
Activity of alter −14.44 (1.84) −1.86 (1.87)
3-cycles-of-generalized-  
 exchange effect
−0.29 (0.09) −0.07 (0.01)
Note: Adapted from Lazega et al. (2006), p.119
a N = 91. b N = 113. Standard errors are in parentheses
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the pecking order) and to build consensus among the epistemic leaders (when too 
many of them occupy the top of the pecking order).
Further analyses (Lazega & Mounier, 2009) have shown that this relationship 
between networks, rotation across places, and learning leads to collective learning 
when judges make decisions requiring their discretion. Such circumstances include 
the choice of whether or not to award damages (punitive or otherwise), to intervene 
in boards (by supporting minority shareholders against the management of a com-
pany), or to intervene in markets (by preventing a given party from terminating a 
contract that was meant to support a weaker party). What is learned in the process 
of collective learning, through a status game leading to upward and outward spirals 
of temporary epistemic status, is the solution that the court considers to be appropri-
ate for problems for which the law does not always provide clear answers. For 
example, in controversies pitting bankers against colleagues mainly from the build-
ing industry, collective learning leads most judges to align their deliberations and 
decisions with the solutions proposed by bankers who hold a law degree. Collective 
learning thereby becomes equated with a form of normative alignment (if not insti-
tutional capture; see Lazega, 2011; Lazega & Mounier, 2012) by which most judges 
are receptive to the solutions outlined by the dominant players in this institution 
(Lazega et al., 2012).
 Dynamic Invariant: Stability from Movement and Emergence 
of Epistemic Status in OMRT Structuration
These processes are not simple. The spinning-top heuristic suggests that centraliza-
tion of advice networks can remain stable or eventually expand or contract to find a 
balance between elite overload and conflicts between interpretations that these het-
erogeneous elites offer. This metaphor leads to the following claim about the struc-
ture and dynamics of advice networks and intraorganizational learning. 
Intraorganizational learning, as an informal process, depends on at least three fac-
tors: (a) the way that members manage their advice ties in the context of this formal 
organization; (b) the ways that central advisors handle overload and conflicts 
between definitions of the situation; and (c) the ways that formal structure can help 
actors deal with the advice network’s oscillation between centralization and decen-
tralization. In effect, variations in centralization over time suggest that this oscilla-
tion serves as a pump in the spinning top. If OMRT can be represented by a spinning 
top, it is because this image accounts for one of the main processes taking place in 
OMRT: the emergence of status in organized social settings.
The extent to which the emergent relational infrastructure in an organization 
remains the same over time—despite the combined turnover of its members and 
turnover in their respective relational profile—is one of the most interesting ques-
tions raised by structural analyses applied in organized social settings. In this case 
the emergent structure of this organization remains the same overall. The finding is 
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that the emergent relational structure remains unchanged. This answer is a function 
of the degree to which observers focus on structure and on the dimensions of the 
structure they examine. As shown in the following section, the existence of a peck-
ing order and of the core–periphery structure itself remains relatively stable thanks 
to their intertwining with formal hierarchy and status competition. But social dif-
ferentiation measured in terms of role relationships and the division of labor shows 
that the relational structure does not remain the same, depending on when and 
where observers look at the process. Intraorganizational relational processes, such 
as collective learning, impose varying constraints on different kinds of members 
over time, and the overall relational structure reflects their changing responses to 
those limitations. Because the processes vary, so does the relational structure, as 
does the resulting emergent overall structure. Even when these dynamics are the 
same, they do not produce identical outcomes. They transform very different initial 
situations. Radical, orthodox structuralism turns out to be wrong.
 OMRT and Catch-up Dynamics at Superimposed  
Levels of Agency
Where does the energy for rotation in OMRT come from to begin with? Posing this 
question is like asking what OMRTs take place in which context. Granted, OMRTs 
are the context of social processes, but they are themselves embedded in a wider, 
macrosocial context. In the example of the spinning top, the energy comes from an 
organizational rule that obliges representatives of an institution to switch places, a 
compelled rotation that is meant to control their behavior given the exogenous sus-
picion of corruption. But at the interorganizational level such rules do not always 
exist in such a formalized way. Nevertheless, if organizations are open systems, then 
they are part of interorganizational systems of interdependencies (observed as “net-
works”) and are thus part of somewhat self-contained systems with a certain level 
of closure and their own dynamics. Movement makes sense from both below (the 
perspective of individual actors who orient their actions to multiple levels) and 
above (the fact that mesosocial order and agency take place in superimposed sys-
tems of interdependencies and collective agency) (Lazega, Jourda, & Mounier, 
2013; Lazega, Jourda, Mounier, & Stofer, 2008).8 In such multilevel systems the 
temporalities of each level differ from each other. Each level must adjust and adapt 
to the evolution of the other level. Attempts at synchronization, however, are usually 
more costly for one level than for another. The level that is dominated will be com-
pelled to pay for synchronization. This imposition can take the form of catching up 
in the competition for status.
The answer to the question about the origin of the energy for OMRT rotation 
therefore has to do with the functioning of the mesolevel in its macrocontext. The 
8 This logic is related to a theory of action that stresses attempts by actors to reshape their opportu-
nity structure (see Lazega & Mounier, 2002; Tilly, 1998).
7 Organized Mobility and Relational Turnover as Context for Social Mechanisms…
132
energy stems from the way power and class struggles function in the organizational 
society: in collective efforts to hoard opportunities and to saddle others with con-
straints while still encouraging or obliging everyone to compete for these same 
opportunities and resources. The clearest way to comprehend the origins of the 
energy for rotation in OMRT is to understand that it is used to concentrate power in 
a stratified organizational society, a society made of superimposed levels of agency. 
Such a society spends a great deal of energy catching up in status-related competi-
tion imposed from above, self-imposed from below, or both. That struggle is not so 
much about catching up with the Joneses next door as it is about adjusting to top- 
down constraints on maintaining or enhancing one’s status. The promise of sharing 
power and status takes the power differentials generated by the structure of organi-
zational society and turns them into a source of energy. Of course, decentralization 
is followed by recentralization. But each step in this catch-up cycle is what pro-
duces the energy for OMRT.
These OMRT are intrinsically multilevel, and the only way to understand them is 
to develop models depicting the dynamics of multilevel networks. These develop-
ments will be at the heart of future explorations in the social sciences. The mesoso-
cial order and the multilevel dimension of social phenomena show that systems of 
superimposed interdependencies (one interorganizational, the other interindividual) 
create dynamics specific to each level. But because levels are partly interlocked, 
dynamics across levels drive each other. Drawing on Simmel’s (1908/2009) ideas 
about social circles and Breiger’s (1974) “dual” approach to the coconstitution of 
individuals and groups in society, sociologists have begun to look at the dynamics of 
multilevel structure and their consequences for societies (Lazega & Snijders, 2016).
Articulation of distinct levels of action for that purpose can be partly accounted 
for, beyond bipartite structures, with a method called structural linked design, 
which brings together networks of different levels by using individuals’ affiliation 
ties, be they single or multiple (see Fig. 7.1). Statistical analyses of linked-design 
data (Wang, Robins, Pattison, & Lazega, 2013; 2015) show that two levels are not 
just superimposed but highly intertwined without being necessarily rigidly nested. 
That relationship implies that changes in ties at one level contribute to changes in 
ties at the other level even if the capacity to force changes at the other level varies 
with socioeconomic attributes of the actors.
At each level actors attempt to structure the contexts of their interactions and 
have to manage the attendant contextually imposed constraints by trying to redesign 
their opportunity structures. In this approach each complete network is examined 
separately and then combined with that of the other level by means of information 
about each individual’s membership in the first network (interindividual) and in one 
of the organizations of the second network (interorganizational). Work undertaken 
so far within this framework has shown that dual or multiple positioning in super-
imposed systems of interdependencies makes it possible to formulate and test pre-
cise hypotheses about the relation between members’ position in the structure and 
individual achievements, especially when this positional reckoning is based on 
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strategies of actors. Using this multilevel approach and reasoning in terms of the 
dynamics of these networks will help specify OMRT dynamics.
This form of dual positioning in the structural contextualization of action distin-
guishes between two levels of agency (one individual, the other organizational) and 
their coconstitution, but without conflating them. Insofar as each level constitutes a 
production and exchange system that has its own logic—its own division of labor 
and system of roles—it is important to examine the various levels separately (as is 
usually the case in the literature) but also jointly. Studying the levels jointly means 
identifying, in particular, the actors who profit from comparatively easy access to 
resources that circulate at each level, and it means measuring their relative achieve-
ment. The term strategy refers to the fact that actors manage their interdependencies 
at different levels by appropriating, accumulating, exchanging, and sharing 
resources, both with peers and with hierarchical superiors or subordinates. One 
observes these strategies by looking at the choices made by interindividual and 
interorganizational exchange partners.
In the multilevel context of this organizational society, individual actors can try 
to reshape their complex opportunity structure by creating new ties and languages 
that escape the control of the organizations with which they are affiliated. In the 
multilevel system actors try to take advantage of spatial and temporal gaps between 
different levels of agency. By doing so, they reap benefits that may prompt them to 
move and set up new organizations that are meant to protect access to these benefits 
and to hoard the new opportunities created by breaking off the constraints that had 
been imposed on them by their former affiliations and bosses. Under specific cir-
cumstances, ongoing interactions between interpersonal and interorganizational 
Fig. 7.1 Real life multilevel network based on a linked-design approach to studying an interindi-
vidual advice network (bottom), an interorganizational contract network (top), and vertical affilia-
tion ties for the individuals in the organizations (Illustration by J. Brailly)
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networks therefore bring about changes, as opposed to mere consolidation, at each 
level. These changes may be great enough to reconfigure the multilevel system if 
they drive the creation of new organizational actors (new collectives). Culture plays 
a substantial part in these dynamics. No collective can be set up without the 
language needed to formulate the conditions under which “synergy” (Archer, 2013, 
p. 13) is achieved and without institutionalization of its rules. The major task of 
culture is thus to produce the language for creating relationships with heteroge-
neous others and to strengthen the institutional dimension of organizations that 
emerge from this effort. The multilevel and cultural dimensions of collective action 
are the two sources of energy that coevolve with OMRT transformations and affect 
social processes such as collective learning.
Why would individuals willingly incur the costs of adjustments and adaptation? 
Answers to this question abound. People may be coerced into accepting such behav-
ior if they are the weakest parties in the system. They may want to increase their 
status. Or it may be culturally and symbolically rewarding to do so. From the per-
spective of the individual actors, such movements (across places) and associated 
relational changes are part of the costs or benefits of reshaping opportunity struc-
tures, if not opportunity-hoarding, in the organizational and class society. Saying 
that structure reflects both opportunity and constraint is equivalent to saying that 
individual actors eventually try to manage the constraints in order to reshape their 
opportunity structure in this organizational society. The opportunities include, for 
example, those of landing a job, obtaining funding for a project, arranging credit for 
an apartment, finding a place in a suitable kindergarten or school for the children, 
and maintaining a steady flow of business.
Individuals trying to reshape their opportunity structure can be portrayed as stra-
tegic, but interdependent, actors who seek contexts in which they can find and 
exchange these resources at low cost. Once in such contexts they can seek various 
forms of concentration of these resources—an initial dimension of power—and 
thereby enable themselves to define the terms of such exchanges, to determine the 
rules of the game. At the individual level this set of goals is the answer to the ques-
tion about the source of the energy for rotations and movements across places: It 
comes from efforts to close the gap between levels of agency. It comes from the 
competition for status.
This view calls for a contemporary definition of social class that is more complex 
than existing ones, for relatively invisible dimensions of opportunity structures are 
growing in significance at the intra- and interorganizational levels. Tilly (1998) 
offered such an organizational view of mechanisms that generate inequality. They 
are the organizational structures that allow for exploitation, entrench it, and make it 
seem natural. From this perspective contemporary social stratification also articu-
lates exploitation (by the elites who hold many of the resources and much of the 
power in society) and opportunity-hoarding (by intermediary classes) as two com-
plementary means for perpetuating inequality. Opportunity monopolists organize 
themselves legally and socially in ways far less conspicuous than the distinction 
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between the bourgeois and the proletarians, constructing well-organized communi-
ties able to dominate the opportunities created by movement. It is not easy to see 
whether someone has the opportunities that others may not have. These opportuni-
ties are comparable to the very efficient implicit or informal rights, often  self- granted 
in an organized group, that are linked to the positions in the inconspicuous relational 
structure (White, 1970).
Organizations, for example, help align social cleavages to create a system of 
inequality in which these cleavages reinforce each other, achieving exclusion and 
exploitation. In the monopolization of opportunities, Tilly (1998) saw the key mech-
anism that reproduces social inequality, joining the mesosocial level to the macro-
social level. Organizations and stratifications reinforce each other, even though the 
knowledge of their own opportunity structures for the individual actors is not obvi-
ous or the modality and the yield of monopolizing are not mechanical. They depend 
on the link-up of a long-term process at the macrolevel and the operations of local 
organizations with their stabilized and specific social disciplines. The starting point 
proposed by Tilly is a complex socioeconomic process at the heart of the neostruc-
tural approach to relations between the meso- and macrosocial levels. Neostructural 
sociologists can measure and model this monopolization by using social and orga-
nizational network analysis as a method that was developed for updating the various 
forms of conflicts and interdependencies between actors and between categories of 
actors.
If synchronization is necessary for the organization to benefit from the individual 
action of its members, especially from individual action that takes place outside the 
organization, creating asynchronies is sometimes what helps individuals break free. 
Collective action at two vertically interdependent levels of agency can thus also be 
a story of one level’s emancipation from the influence of the other and of either 
catching up with that other level or creating a new emergent structure (or, more 
modestly, a new substructure). The lag between the two vertically interdependent 
levels of collective agency can be considered the main source of morphogenesis, 
and the generalization of lags can be seen as the cause of morphogenesis unbound: 
Structuration at one level drives structuration at the other in mostly conflicting, 
chaotic, and unequal ways. There is not always time to adjust and adapt; enormous 
waste and disorganization may characterize the multilevel structuration process.9 
When agents emancipate and create their own organizations, structure and culture 
9 Because this morphogenesis creates dynamics of multilevel networks marked by different levels 
of agency, a new family of models is needed to account for such dynamics. This family of models 
could be a multilevel extension of Snijders’s (1996) model of network dynamics and could use 
characteristics of a level 2 network as a set of exogenous factors in the evolution of a level 1 net-
work and vice versa. The coevolution of both level networks is added to the coevolution of behav-
ior and relational choices. In terms of model specification, new independent variables from 
interorganizational networks operate at the interindividual level and vice versa. A multilevel ver-
sion of Snijders’s model of network dynamics could, for example, introduce dual alters or induced 
potentials (extended opportunity structures as defined by Lazega et al., 2013) into Snijders’s for-
malism in order to propose concepts such as multilevel closure and to measure the effects that one 
level of agency has on the other.
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can be brought together as status and rules by which opposing parties collaborate 
nevertheless. Catching up “depends upon the swift succession of positive feedback 
cycles…, all of which lead to new variety fostering further variety” (Archer, 2013, 
p. 14).
It also matters who manages to stabilize their powerful position in multilevel, 
OMRT systems. Analyses in the courthouse case study above show that organiza-
tional members who have enough staying capacity, status, and epistemic authority 
also represent specific forces in the joint regulation of markets: bankers with a law 
degree. The study shows that advice-seeking does converge toward central and 
supercentral members and reflects a process of epistemic alignment with members 
who have gained the authority to know, who provide social approval for specific 
decisions. Actors and their groups do not learn mechanically. This capacity to learn 
collectively depends particularly on their stability and reframing capacities in 
changing networks, that is, on their switching capacities across social boundaries 
(Breiger, 2010; White, 2008). Members with specific forms of status frame collec-
tive action by providing the judgments of appropriateness that are shared in collec-
tive learning (Lazega, 1992).
OMRT is thus based on limited transformation of the structure (examined in this 
chapter through the status system), which could nevertheless either be controlled 
homeostatically or change more profoundly. This juncture is where such transfor-
mation can, in turn, change the social processes that help members manage the 
problems of collective action.
 Endogenizing Systems of Places: OMRT Research Agenda 
for Sociology and Geography
Reasoning in terms of OMRT dynamics is important because it helps one under-
stand how stability in the system can be precisely created by the enormous quantity 
of movement that it organizes, directly or indirectly. New attention to OMRT 
dynamics is also needed because they assume new forms in contemporary society 
(Archer, 2013, 2014). Speed matters more than ever in everything, members are 
exposed to increasingly open competition as they descend through the social hierar-
chy, and social control has become ever more intrusive. When various sorts of 
mobility slow down or accelerate, new people are left behind and disenfranchised in 
many respects, exclusion that reproduces or creates new social inequalities and hier-
archies. Actors who know how to instrumentalize organizations do better than oth-
ers because they can navigate or even reshape the prior system of places. Relational 
capital of individuals and social capital of organizations have always been leading 
determinants of inequalities (Breiger, 1990, 2011). Some people’s movements and 
mobility create and recreate the stability and wealth of other people, including the 
capacity of those others to acquire and capitalize resources (e.g., status) and 
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positions (e.g., niches) in advantageous relational infrastructures. In the organiza-
tional society individuals are part of organizational systems, and organizations are 
part of interorganizational systems. The coevolution of the levels is not necessarily 
peaceful and harmonious. Synchronization entails costs of adaptation to the other 
level, and the costs of adjustments in dual and asynchronized opportunity structures 
are dumped onto the weakest parts of the system (Lazega, 2013, 2014, 2015). These 
costs can be measured only if one understands how OMRT dynamics shape the 
coevolutionary, recursive nature of the transformations they create—that is, struc-
tural emergence. 
Much remains to be done to carry out this program. Changes in social mecha-
nisms that help members of collective actors manage the problems of collective 
action are occurring in contexts defined more and more by OMRT dynamics and 
structuration derivable from residential, educational, and professional forms of 
mobility. Collective learning is only one of the processes that help members of soci-
ety deal with these dilemmas (Glückler & Hammer, 2012, 2014; Lazega, 2012). The 
capacity of societies to adapt to changes and environments that they themselves 
have brought about depends on their OMRT dynamics.
In addition, this chapter’s exclusive emphasis on status as a relational infrastruc-
ture of vertical differentiation is due only to lack of space. Other such social forms, 
such as horizontally discrete social niches and systems of niches, can be regarded as 
linchpins between OMRT and collective action. They represent forms of the social 
division of labor in all socially organized contexts, with their multilevel and super-
imposed role systems. Social niches in their system of niches are among the rela-
tional infrastructures that precondition social processes such as solidarity and social 
control. They are part of the definition of the initial system of places across which 
mobility takes place to begin with. Niches and status alike are forms by which 
socially rational actors seek to structure the contexts of their interactions and their 
social and economic exchanges. If the changes in the system of places itself are 
interpreted as OMRT driven and as the ultimate expression of domination, then 
places will no longer be regarded as exclusively exogenous entities in the social sci-
ences but rather as coevolutionary detrminants and outcome of social processes.
It is fundamental to understand that the links between interdependent processes 
also have an effect on the relational infrastructures reconstituted by the observer and 
endogenized by the actors. These effects lie at the origin of the dynamics of rela-
tional structures: New rules can reconfigure a system of niches; exercise of social 
control can encourage the emergence of new forms of social status and modify 
principles of status consistency. In turn, the new processes that result from these 
changes facilitate new modes of coordination. To improve the understanding of 
what agency means in this interpersonal, interorganizational, and dynamic context, 
neostructural sociologists must still develop methods that combine the systematic 
study of longitudinal and multilevel data on identities, trajectories (in the long 
term), exchange networks, and representations (or controversies). The fact that new 
rules can reconfigure a system of places is not obvious. Orthodox structuralists have 
challenged such statements (Pizarro, 1999, 2007). It is on this point that sociolo-
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gists, geographers, and historians need to collaborate when pursuing the joint 
research agenda of tracking OMRT and their effects on collective action.
Indeed, it may be that the social sciences are able to treat these systems of places, 
these forms of the division of labor, as endogenous only with the assistance of geog-
raphers or other specialists on spatial and organizational movement (Bathelt & 
Glückler, 2011; Glückler, 2012, 2013). Geographers become crucial in the 
 description and modeling of OMRT dynamics of all kinds because the social reality 
that such researchers observe is spatial, organizational, relational, multilevel, and 
dynamic. Contemporary public statistical datasets are ill suited for this purpose and 
for the measurement of OMRT dynamics in interaction with social stratification 
in the organizational society. Geographers and sociologists can design joint research 
projects on residents switching neighborhoods (e.g., Lévy, 1998), people migrating 
from countryside to the city and back (Lemercier & Rosental, 2008), entire popula-
tions making an exodus from one continent to the other, and the changes occurring 
at the meso- and macrolevels because of such movements. Much of what happens 
in social life at meso and macro levels combined is OMRT-related phenomena char-
acterized by the dynamics of multilevel structures where relational infrastructures 
necessarily function as gears driving evolution. They can be reconstituted in all 
areas of social life provided that a longitudinal perspective articulates coevolution-
ary changes across places (mobility) and in relationships (networks). Neostructural 
sociologists argue that social change at the mesolevel must be examined process by 
process at each level of agency (interindividual or interorganizational). To describe 
and analyze these systems adequately, the challenge is in observing and reconstruct-
ing these combined dynamics in interdisciplinary collaboration conceived to make 
sense of vast amounts of heterogeneous data gathered on various scales. That work 
will provide the framework for building a general theoretical approach to such 
OMRT phenomena with up- and down-stream effects.
Mapping and modeling OMRT is how geographers and sociologists can account 
for the link between the meso- and macrolevels, indeed for the way in which meso-
level actors build the macrolevel. Therefore, their function in documenting and 
explaining social change is to explore these OMRT dynamics at multiple levels 
simultaneously. These modalities are the ways in which actors manage the multi-
level dimension of their society, moving (or not) from one level to the other and 
organizing these adjustments and their costs. As shown in analyses of regulation and 
governance, such exploration can yield a theory of action to guide dynamic, multi-
level modeling and, eventually, to afford a fresh look at politics. In this respect much 
remains to accomplish.
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